In this paper, we raise these research questions as an initial attempt to propose a comparative research agenda on institutions and the policy process using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. The IAD framework is among the most widely used frameworks in the policy-studies literature (Sabatier, 1999) . The framework has been extensively used to study political theory, collaboration, polycentricity and coproduction, governance of environment, natural resources and common pool resources, foreign aid and development, urban and infrastructure governance, among others. It has been widely used particularly in the USA but also in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
INTRODUCTION
Much is known in the literature about institutions and the policy process; see, for instance Howlett et al. ( 2009 ) , March and Olsen ( 1989 ) , Mintrom and Williams ( 2013 ) , Wu and Knoke (2013) , Miller and Demir (2007) , Fischer et al. ( 2007 ) , DeLeon and Vogenbeck ( 2007 ) , Parsons (1995), and McConnell ( 2013 ) , among others.
However, the analysis of institutions and their effects on public policy and the policy process generally tend to be implicit and Western-centric. Little is known, for example, about whether the processes and outcomes of agenda setting vary by types of political institutions, for instance, between western liberal democracies and the Chinese political system. Likewise, do the formation, dynamics, and performance of policy subsystems vary by political institutions? Do the effi cacy of policy instruments and the processes and outcomes of policy implementation vary with political institutions regardless of whether a system is polycentric? Does the process of policy-making, policy design, and instrument choice and implementation Institutions and the Policy Process 2.0:
Implications of the IAD Framework
THE IAD FRAMEWORK

Overview
The IAD framework was developed based on decades of work pioneered by scholars at the Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, as well as related and affi liated scholars. Presented in its initial form in Kiser and Ostrom ( 1982 ) , the framework provides a lens to understand how collective decisions are made by viewing such decisions as outputs of human interactions infl uenced by a set of contextual factors. The framework's value lies in how it lays out a comprehensive set of elements, explains how each element relates to the other, and sheds light on how institutions (rules, norms, and strategies) contribute to shaping the interests and interactions of individuals or actors. The IAD framework dissects the working of institutions using a systems approach based on the input-process-output-feedback cycle. The inputs are contextual factors (exogenous variables) that infl uence actors and the action situations they face. How actors interact with each other within an action arena is the process. The outputs of this process are collective decisions which are enforced or implemented and evaluated against a set of criteria. Over time these decisions (re)shape the contextual factors. Contextual factors (also called exogenous variables) consist of three broad aspects: the nature (biophysical conditions) of the good, the attributes of the community, and the rules used by community members. First, depending on excludability and rivalry characteristics, a particular good may have a biophysical "nature" as private good, toll good, pure public good, or common pool good. Each type of good needs to be managed differently, but the latter (common pool good or resource) presents unique challenges and opportunities which could lead to "prisoner's dilemma" and "tragedy of the commons" situations. Second, attributes of the community include the presence or absence of collective values such as trust, reciprocity, common understanding, social capital, and cultural repertoire. Third, formal and informal rules that are used by the community can be evaluated in terms of how they regulate the following seven aspects: positions (i.e., Who can be a leader?), boundaries (Who can be a member of the community?), authority (What powers do leaders and enforcers possess?), aggregation (How are various inputs from community members consolidated?), scope (To what extent can extraction be made from the common pool resource?), information (What information is public and which are closed?), and payoffs (What is the extent and reliability of punishment and reward?).
The process in the IAD framework is contained within an action situation, which is basically a "black box" where "individuals in positions take actions, in light of information, the control they exercise, and the payoffs they face, to attempt to achieve outcomes and results" (Ostrom, cited in McGinnis, 2011 ) . Here, the actors are seen as intendedly rational individuals who are bounded by the contextual or exogenous factors. The possible "moves" of the actors could be strategically analyzed, for example, by game theoretic models which were used quite extensively by Elinor Ostrom and her associates (i.e., in Ostrom, 1994; Holzinger, 2003 ) .
Outputs of the action situation are compounded by those of other action situations to produce outcomes at the community level. These outcomes are then compared with the community's "evaluative criteria" to determine whether they are economically effi cient, equitable, fair, fi scally accountable, and socially participative, legitimate, and consistent with moral values (E. Ostrom, 1990 ) . Results of the evaluations, in turn, feed back to the contextual factors and action situation.
The workings of institutional analysis as explained by the IAD framework happen at "three worlds of action" (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982 ) : the constitutional level, the collective-choice level, and the operational level. This highlights that an action taken at a certain more practical level is embedded in actions taken at higher collective-and constitutional-choice levels. Thus, an attempt to change institutions at an operational level often faces challenges if the collective-choice and constitutional levels are ignored.
Origins of the IAD Framework
Though widely known and used, little is known other than the fact that the IAD framework traces its intellectual origins to a number of political theorists. Political theory refers to "all efforts to understand the institutional foundations of governance (and public policy) particularly how to relate philosophical principles and normative values to the practical challenges of implementing these principles and values in real world political institutions" (V. Ostrom, quoted in McGinnis, 2011 ) . For instance, political theory might help policy scholars to ask, how might the normative values of the Golden Rule (do unto others what you want others do unto you) or Rousseau's principle (the greatest good for the greatest number) be translated into the real world of institutional and policy design?
The political theories underpinning the IAD framework and the corpus of the Ostrom Workshop's research agenda can be traced to the old tradition of Tocqueville, Hobbes, Hamilton, Rousseau, Madison, Hayek, Hume, Montesquieu, Polanyi, and others. Of these, Hobbes, Tocqueville, and the Federalist Papers occupy a central place in the Ostrom Workshop's intellectual tradition. Hobbes used a normative method of inquiry-based on the assumption that individuals are selfi sh and driven by their passions (state of nature)-to arrive at a conclusion that a Leviathan (or absolute sovereign) is central to establishing and maintaining a social contract to govern a society of self-seeking individuals.
The opposite of the Leviathan is Tocqueville's Democracy in America , in which he explained how democracy has fl ourished in North America but not in Europe. Tocqueville concluded that democracy in America was made possible because of three factors: (1) the geographical characteristics of the continent (which made it less vulnerable to the intricacies of European power relations) and its rich natural endowments (to support the development of settlements); (2) the characteristics of its Anglo-American settlers-their "habits of hearts and minds"; and (3) the institutions they built-churches, juries, townships. These three variables eventually became the contextual foundation of the IAD framework (see Fig. 5 .1 ).
In addition to Hobbes and Tocqueville, the IAD framework and the Ostrom Workshop's research agenda have been signifi cantly infl uenced by the Federalist Papers . The IAD framework along with other diagnostic tools was designed to help answer this fundamental research question.
The State of the IAD Literature
Ostrom ( 2007 ) provides an overview of how the IAD framework in its various forms has been utilized to explore institutional development. As early as the 1970s, Ostrom and colleagues were already exploring issues related to polycentricity and metropolitan governance, including police force management (Ostrom, 1972; Ostrom et al., 1973 ; Parks, 1985) . Along with other researchers, they found that public safety could not be created by the police alone, but must involve the active role of citizens, and posited the concept of coproduction. Ostrom ( 1965 ) was also among the fi rst to highlight the issue of public entrepreneurship while studying the management of groundwater basin in the Los Angeles region.
The largest area in which the IAD has been utilized is the study of common pool resources. Starting with a 1986 seminar on the study of common property organized by the National Research Council, scholars in this fi eld have further built international networks and a rich collection of literature regarding the topic. The International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) was established in 1989 and meets biannually. Various models and theories have been developed (i.e., Ostrom, 1994; Ostrom, 1991, 1993 ) and tested through experiments (i.e., Casari and Plott, 2003 ; Cardenas, 2000 ) .
The Ostrom Workshop has developed an extensive database of case studies regarding common pool resource from all over the world (Ostrom 2007 ) . Although the case studies were written by many scholars of diverse backgrounds, specifi c information about institutional variables (as identifi ed by the IAD framework) was extracted and structured such that various aspects of a large number of common pool resources around the world were available for cross-analyses. Examples of these analyses include comparisons of robust, fragile, and failed institutions that tried to govern common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990 ) , and more specifi c analyses on inshore fi sheries (Schlager, 1994) and irrigation systems (Tang, 1991) around the world. The topics of irrigation systems and forestry management, in particular, have generated much research and contributed to the building of an extensive IAD framework-generated database.
More recently, the IAD and other frameworks associated with New Institutional Economics have been used to dissect the institutions that are related to various issues, such as economic development (Shirley, 2008) , water governance (Saleth and Dinar, 2004; Pérard, 2009) , land titling (Di Tella et al., 2004 ) , land use (Donnelly, 2009 ) , climate adaptation in the commons (Araral, 2012 ) , forestry (Andersson, 2003 ; Hayes, 2007 ; Pacheco, 2006; Persha and Blomley, 2009, Jagger, 2009 ; Marquez Barrientos, 2011 ) , watershed and river basins (Myint, 2005 ; Heikkila, Schlager, and Davis, 2011 ) , and global commons (McGinnis and Ostrom, 1996) , among others.
Other than common pool natural resources, the IAD framework has also been used on knowledge commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2006 ) ; infrastructure in developing countries (Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, 1993) ; property rights (Kauneckis, 2005 ; Mwangi, 2003) ; donor-recipient relationship (Araral, 2008 ) ; public housing (Choe, 1992) ; non-profi ts (Eliott-Teague, 2007) , social dilemmas (Ahn, 2001 ; Araral, 2009 ) , peace and nation building in Liberia (Sawyer, 2005) , foreign aid (Gibson, Williams, and Ostrom, 2005 ) , and many other topics.
Parallel frameworks focusing on slightly different aspects than the IAD have also been established, such as the Situation, Structure, and Performance framework (Schmid, 2004) . The IAD framework itself is also constantly evolving, where one of the developments-the Social-Ecological Systems framework-places balanced attention on both the biophysical and ecological bases of institutions (McGinnis, 2011 ) .
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLICY PROCESS
In this section, we address this gap in the literature. We explore several implications of institutional theory for the policy-process literature in terms of agenda setting, policy subsystems, politics and policy, instrument choice, implementation, learning and isomorphism, the role of language and ideas, and the importance of developing a set of diagnostic tools.
The IAD framework in turn can help systematize this promising research agenda by providing a framework for comparative institutional analysis of the policy process.
Agenda Setting
The IAD framework and Ostrom's approach to institutional analysis can help recast the debate and questions on agenda setting along the following lines: Do the processes and outcomes of agenda setting vary by types of political institutions ? If so , how and why ?
In the agenda-setting literature in general, the importance of political institutions has not often explicitly and been recognized-see, for example, the extensive review of the literature by Parsons (1995) and more recently by Green-Pedersen and Walgrave ( 2014 ). Kingdon's ( 1984 ) classic model in agenda setting may be an appropriate metaphor in mature liberal democracies given the important role of political parties, think tanks, interest groups, bureaucracies, and the media in shaping the policy agenda. This may not be the case, however, for nonliberal democracies where these players are weak or nonexistent. In countries where agents of the state are subject to capture by vested interests, agenda setting is more predictable compared to countries with more pluralist political traditions. Despite these obvious differences, policy-process scholars have done little to study how variations in political institutions matter to the process and outcomes of agenda setting.
Policy Subsystems
This brings us to our second research question: Does the formation , dynamics, and performance of policy subsystems vary by political institutions ? If so , how and why ?
Researchers have extensively studied the factors that infl uence the structure and dynamics of policy subsystems. For instance, the literature has examined the importance of public salience, catastrophic events, changing government priorities, elections, media coverage, modifi cations to the problem defi nition, involvement of policy entrepreneurs promoting new policies, changes in economic or social conditions, or decisions in other policy domains that may impact the structure and activities of the subsystem itself.
Curiously, the literature has not systematically studied how variations in political and economic institutions affect the formation , structure , dynamics, and performance of policy subsystems. Institutional scholars would point to the obvious: that policy subsystems cannot be divorced from their institutional context. Liberal democracies and polycentric systems produce different policy subsystems and advocacy coalitions compared to a one-party state. In China, for example, the role of independent advocacy coalitions is very limited. Offi cial government and party think tanks, academics, traditional and social media, local governments, and international agencies have some limited roles to play; but the formation, dynamics, and performance of policy subsystems in China differs significantly from that of the USA.
What this clearly implies is that it is no longer enough to make a generic argument that politics affect policies and policies affect politics. Rather, scholars must take a step further to show how certain political institutions-for instance, parliamentary democracy, single-party states, monarchial societies, or a federal structure-matters with regard to policy subsystems, process, or implementation.
Policy Instruments
This brings us to our third research question: Does the effi cacy of policy instruments vary with political institutions? If so, how and why ?
Third, the effectiveness or effi ciency of policy instruments cannot be divorced from their institutional underpinnings. For instance, the effi cacy of regulatory and market-based policy instruments would differ among countries with neoliberal as opposed to ordoliberal democracies (i.e., Germany). In neoliberal settings, market-based instruments such as incentives, property rights, contracts and private actors play important roles. In contrast, in ordoliberal settings, the blunt instruments of government regulation set the structure, dynamics, and performance of the market.
The effi cacy of regulatory instruments would also depend on the monitoring and enforcement capacities of the regulatory agency and their autonomy from vested interests. Developed economies would have stronger monitoring and enforcement capacities as well as generally more autonomy from vested interests compared with developing economies. Furthermore, the impact of fi scal and monetary policy instruments would also depend on whether a country has a parliamentary or presidential form of government. Parliamentary governments tend to incur larger budget defi cits as a result of electoral cycles and coalition politics.
Policy Implementation
This brings us to our fourth research question: Does policy implementation vary with political institutions? If so, how and why ?
Fourth, the effectiveness of policy implementation clearly depends on its institutional foundation-that is, whether the state is federal/polycentric or Unitarian, centralized or decentralized, and ordoliberal or neoliberal. In federal states, federal policies are often enforced by the states, which enjoy some degree of independence and thus pose implementation challenges.
Take the case of polycentric systems of governance. A polycentric system is described by McGinnis ( 2011 ) as having the following features: (1) multi-level (i.e., local, provincial, national, regional, global units of governance); (2) multi-type (i.e., general-purpose nested jurisdictions [as in traditional federalism] and specialized, cross-jurisdictional political units [such as special districts]); (3) multi-sectoral (i.e., public, private, voluntary, community-based, and hybrid kinds of organizations); and (4) multi-functional (i.e., incorporating specialized units for provision (policy-making), production (or coproduction), fi nancing, coordination, monitoring, sanctioning, and dispute resolution).
Policy implementation in such a governance setting clearly poses a different kind of implementation challenge than it would in a centralized, top-down form of governance. In polycentric/federal systems, federal authorities would have to employ innovative mechanisms to motivate the states to align their priorities with federal priorities. This means the use of matching and conditional grants, coordinating mechanisms, norms and moral suasion among others. In more centralized settings with weaker capabilities (such as Myanmar), these policy instruments, for example, matching grants, are not likely to be effective.
Policy implementation also varies between liberal and ordoliberal political settings. In Hong Kong, a classic liberal market economy, market forces and market-based instruments play a dominant role in areas such as public housing, education, and transport. In contrast, in an ordoliberal economy like Singapore, government plays a much more prominent role in these policy areas, primarily through regulation and ownership.
Legal Traditions
This brings us to our fi fth set of research questions: Does the process of policy-making , policy design, and instrument choice and implementation vary by legal origin? Do we observe these variations within civil law countries -Germany , France , China , Russia, and Scandinavia-and within common law countries such as Australia , UK , Canada , India, and South Africa ?
Legal traditions (i.e., common law or civil law and variations among them such as French, German, socialist, and Scandinavian civil law) have different implications for the development and implementation of public policies. In theory, in common law countries, legal precedents create stronger path dependencies for public policies than they do in civil law countries. Also, in common law countries, courts play a more active role in shaping regulatory frameworks such as contract and tort law. As Damaška ( 1986 ) notes, civil law is oriented toward policy implementation while common law is oriented toward dispute resolution.
Empirically, La Porta et al. ( 1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 Porta et al. ( , 2008 found that (1) the effects of legal tradition can be empirically studied; and (2) variations in legal origins can help explain variations in fi nancial sector development (La Porta et al., 1998 ) ; bank ownership ; burden of entry regulations (Djankov et al., 2002 ) , regulation of labor markets (Botero et al., 2004 ) , incidence of military conscription (Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005a,b) , and government ownership of the media (Djankov et al., 2003 ) .
Despite this large empirical literature showing the relationship between legal origins and certain economic and non-economic outcomes, policy studies scholars have not systematically studied its implications. This is evident, for instance, in a systematic review of the literature (key word search) over the last 20 years in the mainstream journals Policy Sciences, Policy Studies, Governance, Journal of Public Administration Research, and Theory and Public Administration Review.
Policy Learning, Isomorphism, and Policy Transfer
This brings us to our sixth research question: Does policy learning , isomorphism and policy transfer vary with the institutional setting ? If so , how and why ?
Policy learning, isomorphism, and policy transfer can likewise be sensitive to the institutional context. Countries that allow competition among states or local governments or have open, competitive economies also have incentives to learn or innovate faster compared to countries where there are no similar competitive pressures.
Countries with strong, professional bureaucracies are more likely to learn better and faster than countries with weaker bureaucracies. Countries where the transaction cost is relatively low-for instance, because of a strong rule of law-are more likely to adapt and learn faster and more effectively that countries with high transaction costs. Thus, regions which face strong competitive pressures but have high quality bureaucracy and strong rule of law-Hong Kong and Singapore, for example-tend to show higher levels of policy learning , isomorphism, and policy transfer .
China is an interesting case study on policy learning, isomorphism, and policy transfer. For instance, the most important policy reforms in Chinaeconomic, social, legal, political, administrative-typically go through a process of policy learning, experimentation, evaluation, and national replication. China follows the principle of "crossing the river by feeling the stone one step at a time" on matters of policy learning and transfer.
Ideas, Language, and Reasoning
This brings us to our seventh research question: Can we also conceptualize politics as the art and science of association and not just in traditional terms of distribution of power and confl ict? If so, what is the role of language, ideas and reasoning in this reconceptualization of politics?
The ideational turn in the policy-studies literature in the 1990s mostly concludes that ideas indeed matter to the development of policies and institutions (Schmidt, 2008 ) . This literature basically examined how ideas have infl uenced the development of policies (Blyth, 1997 ; Braun, 1999 ; Hall, 1993 ; Howlett and Rayner, 1995 ; Chadwick, 2000 ) .
The ideational turn in the policy studies literature, however, is not really new. Vincent Ostrom's attention to language, reasoning, and ideas predates by three decades the "ideational turn" in the policy-studies literature that fl ourished in the 1990s. Elinor Ostrom explored the same theme when she challenged the conventional, pessimistic view of the tragedy of the commons metaphor and the Prisoner's Dilemma.
The Ostroms conclude that the ability to communicate , reason , contest , understand, and commit makes it possible to design institutions by reason and choice rather than be subject to accident, force, tragedies or dilemmas. This is an important point because institutions and policies are human artifacts that require communication, reasoning, understanding, and commitment if they are to be effective in infl uencing human behavior.
Indeed, language is central in the development of culture and diverse forms of governance (such as polycentricity), which in turn, has important implications for the politics of policy and institutional design, implementation, agenda setting, actors and coalitions, policy learning and change, and indeed the ideational turn in policy studies .
Polycentricity and Public Entrepreneurs
The Ostroms have devoted their lives to the study of polycentric institutional settings-that is, multi-level, multi-functional, multi-type, and multi-sectoral settings. The IAD framework-in part-has been inspired by the need to provide scholars with diagnostic tools to study and compare the causes and consequences of institutions. The literature on polycentricity, however, has remained under-appreciated in the policy-studies literature. Many questions have been raised about the effectiveness , efficiency , fairness, and political feasibility of a polycentric social order.
First, how can externalities-a key concern for policy-makers-be internalized through institutional design? For instance, negative externalities from individual European Union (EU) member's trade, fi scal, labor and monetary policies in the EU have been internalized and harmonized in Brussels. The politics of a common fi scal policy has proved to be more diffi cult because it has been framed as a question of sovereignty. In the southwestern USA, for example, the politics of water allocation in the Colorado River Basin has been addressed through a regional body formed by and representing the interests of various stakeholders.
These two seemingly disparate examples raise some important issues concerning institutional theory for policy design, instrument choice, implementation, and evaluation: How should the problem of negative externality to be dealt with? What would be the implications for policy instrument choice in dealing with negative externalities in polycentric versus nonpolycentric systems of governance ?
A second important question on the effi ciency of polycentric arrangements pertains to the extent to which cooperative arrangements exist among units of governments to undertake joint activities of mutual benefi t. How do these cooperative arrangements evolve or not evolve? How effective are these arrangements? This question is particularly important in view of the popularity of the collaborative governance literature in the USA.
Third, and similarly, are there other decision-making arrangements for processing and resolving confl icts among different units of government? In many other cases where confl icts are intractable, the likely problem is that there is no effective correspondence of different units of government to regulate the problem of negative externalities nor are there established cooperative arrangements among units of governments to undertake joint activities of mutual benefi t.
These three questions about the effectiveness and effi ciency of polycentricity raise an important question that has not been properly studied in the literature: the role of public entrepreneurs. Public entrepreneurship has particularly important implications for the effi ciency of polycentric patterns of social order because of the real problem of policy paralysis or gridlock, a subject that has not received adequate attention by scholars of policy studies.
Here, it bears noting that the Ostrom Workshop's focus on public entrepreneurs predates by two decades the literature on policy entrepreneurs in Kingdon's ( 1984 ) Multiple Streams and Windows Framework and Sabatier's (1988) advocacy coalition framework. In fact, the dissertation of Elinor Ostrom (1965) is all about the role of public entrepreneurs in solving the water crisis in Los Angeles in the 1950s.
Diagnostic Tools for Contextual Analysis
One of the main distinguishing features of the IAD framework is to highlight the importance of context to policy and institutional analysis. Undertaking contextual analysis requires developing a set of diagnostic tools. To this end, the Ostrom Workshop contributed in signifi cant ways to the development and fi ne tuning of a repertoire of tools and approaches that the policy studies literature can draw upon: comparative institutional analysis, critical case studies, Tocquevillian analytics, multi-level analysis, laboratory and fi eld experiments, analytic narratives, historical and evolutionary institutional analysis, agent-based modeling, game theoretic modeling, institutional econometric analysis, neural networks analysis, the Geographic Information System, among many others (see Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2009) .
A cursory review of the policy studies literature suggests that these set of diagnostic tools remain underutilized outside of the Ostrom network. Part of the reason for this is that Ph.D. training in public policy remains dominated by traditional tools such as cost-benefi t analyses, econometric analyses, qualitative research methods, among others.
From Effi ciency to Democratic Governance
Finally, beyond the IAD framework and institutional theory, an important contribution of the Ostrom Workshop to the policy studies literature is to remind scholars that they should broaden their concerns beyond efficiency, equity, effectiveness, and political feasibility to explicitly consider normative communitarian values such as legitimacy , fairness , accountability , self-governance, and citizenship .
To the Ostroms, these values are important in of themselves. However, they were also concerned with the larger issues of the feasibility, robustness, or vulnerability of institutions of democratic governance. Indeed, Vincent Ostrom's classic works-The Meaning of Democracy and its Vulnerability ; The Political Theory of a Compound Republic ; The Intellectual Crises of American Public Administrationwere all concerned at their core with the feasibility and vulnerability of democratic/polycentric governance.
Likewise, Elinor Ostrom's work on the evolution of institutions governing the commons and the second-generation theories of collective action, social capital, trust and reciprocity and institutional diversity among others, represents the micro-mirror of Vincent's work. At the heart of the Ostrom Workshop's research program-to paraphrase Tocqueville-is the question of whether societies of boundedly rational individuals are capable of designing human constitutions through refl ection and choice (the Federalist argument) or whether they are forever destined to become the Hobbesian victims of force, accident, tragedies, dilemmas, or Faustian bargains.
C ONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have raised ten research questions in our attempt to propose a comparative research agenda on institutions and the policy process. We argue that the IAD framework is useful in answering these questions because of its open-ended, multi-disciplinary, diagnostic, and systems approach. We hope that these research questions can help renew interest in the study of institutions and the policy process.
